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Abstract 
• Ill 
This paper seeks a philosophical explanation as to why certain mathematical settings seem 
more accomodating to certain theorems, especially when this is a new setting formulated after 
the theorem. I will emphasise the distinction between the formal language of mathematical 
symbolism and its informal counterpart, conceived as & metalangauge. This distinction is 
characterised using the intension/ extension distinction, borrowed from the study of natural 
languages. The same natural language distinction is then applied tb the notion of logical 
consequence, in order to clarify the conceptual relationships between old and new settings. It 
will turn out that a semantic conception of mathematical truth best explains the foregoing 
conclusions while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of traditional Platonism. 
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1 Introduction 
In the history of mathematics, there are many instances of propositions appearing resistant to 
proof for long periods of time, until a substantial reconceptualisation take place. At this point, 
such difficult theorems can take on a new, more tractable form. For instance, Riemann saw 
that elliptic functions exhibit more comptehensible behaviour when defined over a 'doughnut' 
of complex values, as opposed to the complex plane. 1 In terms of the progress of mathematics 
as a science, this is a good thing. The mathematician Philip Davis notes how 
.. .in mathematics there is a long and vitally important record of impossibilities 
being broken by the introduction of structural changes, (1987; cited in Wilson 
[1992], p.150) 
However, from a philosophical point of view, this 'vitally important' phenomenon raises a 
problem. Mathematical truths are usually taken to be eternally true and, as such, are inde-
pendant of events which occur in the physical world .. When a reconceptualisation takes place, 
it is often the case that while some statements in the original context benefit from the change, 
others that were true (maybe trivially so) will become false; for instance, when moving from 
an affine geometrical setting to a projective one, the statement that parallel lines never meet 
is falsified. Thus, the idea that mathematical impossibilities can be 'broken' challenges the 
supposed permanence of mathematical knowledge. 
In this discussion, I will focus on one aspect of this 'breaking of impossibilities'. The 
'introduction of structural changes' will only fruitfully break impossibilities if such changes 
result in what may be termed a more 'natural' conception of the problems which led to the 
need for the changes in the first place. Thus, in §1 I will give an example of a structural 
reconceptualisation rendering possible new mathematical results. §2 will begin a philosophi-
cal analysis of this phenomenon, beginning with a treatment of the relation between the roles 
played by deductive rigour and conceptual clarity in constituting mathematical knowledge. 
The notion of logical consequence will be examined in §3, for if such structural reconceptu-
1Wilson (1992), p.151 
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alisations are fruitful, then it would appear that there is some kind of logical relationship 
between the old setting and the new. §4 will sketch a philosophical view of the nature of 
mathematical knowledge which can incorporate, and account for, the conclusions of §§2 and 
3. 
2 An Example of Reconceptualisation 
Consider the following figure on the Euclidean plane: The lines AB and BC are both tangent 
c 
Figure 1 
to the ellipse E1; however, the line CA clearly is not. This leads to the conclusion that " .. .for 
two ellipses, one within the other, there is usually no triangle inscribed in one of the ellipses 
circumscribed about the other." 2 However, an exception is when the ellipses are actually 
circles, 3 and the triangle is equilateral (figure 2). Nevertheless, it can be shown that this 
R 
Figure 2 
2Rosenbaum (1963), p.lO (pp. 10-17 of this volume is my source for this scetion) 
3While it is true that from an affine point of view, there is no difference between a circle and an ellipse, I 
will use the term 'circle' in its everyday meaning to improve clarity 
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is not a singular exception. Consider the act of 'projecting' from a point Q through the 
plane which contains figure 2 onto another, non-parallel plane (figure 3): the points X and 
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Yon the original plane have been mapped to the points X' and Y' on the new plane by the 
projection from Q (as have all the other points which lie on the original plane). Thus, the 
new plane contains an object which looks like figure 4: we have two ellipses E~ and E~ which 
R' X' ~· 
Figure 4 
are definitely not circles, and the triangle P'Q' R' is not equilateral. However, the lines of the 
triangle are all tangential to the inner ellipse. Because figure 2 is symmetrical, the vertices 
of the triangle could be any set of three points on the outer circle which are equidistant from 
each other along E4 - and the result of projection from Q as in figure 3 would yield a shape 
on the new plane different from that in figure 4. Nevertheless, it will still be the case that the 
4 
three sides of the new triangle are all tangential to the inner ellipse. This is a particular case 
of a theorem due to Poncelet: 
If two conics cl and c2 are such that an n-gon c~n be inseribed in cl and circumscribed 
about C2 , then there are infinitely many n-gons in the same relationship to the conics, with 
any point on C1 serving as a vertex of an .n,-gon. (Rosenbaum (1963), p.l2) 
However, this argument from projection requires the assumption, implicit in the discussion 
above, that projection is bijective- that is, all points in the original plane are projected to one 
and only one point on the new plane. Things standing as they are, this can only be the case 
when the planes are parallel. If they are not (as in figure 3), then any location of the origin 
of projection will result in at least one projective line failing to meet the new plane (figure 5). 
This happens when the line produced by the projection from Z through P is parallel to the 
z 
Figure 5 
new plane. Thus, the operation of projection is not in general a one-to-one correspondence. 
This results in the loss of general certainty regarding whether a point which is a vertex of the 
inscribed n-gon tangential to the inner ellipse will be projected to a point on the new plane 
with the same properties4 - or to a point at all. In order to eliminate the exceptional case 
where the projected line from Z through Pis parallel to the new plane, projective geometers 
add a so-called 'ideal point', which is defined to be the point at which the line from Z through 
P meets the plane it is parallel to. If one imagines standing on a set of railway tracks, looking 
down the parallel toward the horizon, then one observes that the two tracks appear to meet 
at the horizon- an 'infinitely far' distance (no matter how long .one spends walking the tracks, 
4Disregarding metric properties, which are not preserved under projection. 
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the point at which they (appear to) intersect will never be reached). Thus the term 'point 
at infinity' which is used to describe the points at which parallels meet, and 'line at infinity' 
for the horizon (the line comprised of all the 'points at infinity'). It will be worth noting that 
there is only ever one point at infinity for each direction, no matter how many parallel lines 
are running in that direction- just as if one is standing on a large rail-line with many parallel 
tracks running in the same direction, they stiU appear to meet at a single point. 
Thus, it seems that adding points which violate Euclid's parallel postulate - i.e. replacing 
'two distinct lines in a plane either have one and only one point in common or are parallel' with 
'two distinct lines in a plane have one and only one point in common'5 results in what many 
have termed a 'completion' of Euclidean geometry.6 Once equipped with ideal points and the 
line at infinity, geometers were able to show that not only were many difficult theorems of 
Euclidean geometry were made more tractable in the new 'setting' (the one with points at 
infinity), such as Poncelet's theorem, above, but also that the projective setting (combined 
with complex co-ordinate points) enabled analytic proofs of situations which appear totally 
distinct from the synthetic point of view7 • New discoveries were occurring due to the addition 
and acceptance of seemingly obscure objects (the term 'imaginary' for the complex number 
i = /=1) was originally intended to be derogetory). It is this phenomenon, of a 'change of 
setting' - a reconceptualisation - resulting in the 'conceptual clarification' which is displayed 
by the increased ease of solving old conjectures and the appearance of new theorems, which 
I will seek to philosophically address. 
3 Change of Setting and 'Naturalness' 
The philosopher and mathematician, Rene Descartes, considered mathematical knowledge 
to be indubitable and a priori because it is possessed of two defining qualities: clarity and 
distinctness. Mathematical objects are distinct because they are defined by all and only those 
statements which are true of them. For instance, the number '7' is defined by all the sums, 
5ibid, p.16 
6 
"The new elements are added to complete the mechanism that makes Euclidean geometry work." (Wilson 
(1992), p.161) 
7see Wilson (1992) for an example 
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differences, products, etc. which it produces when combined with other numbers.8 This is 
in direct contrast to scientific objects (such as organisms, molecules, and planets) which are 
considered to be essentially constant even when statements formerly thought true of them 
are falsified (light is not considered to be a physically different phenomenon to what it was 
in the 17th century, even though we now know that it does not always travel in 'straight' 
lines). Mathematical knowledge is clear because it provides conceptual reification of whatever 
is being studied; for instance, the proof of the Pythagorean theorem adds to our concept of 
'triangle' by making explicit general facts about' certain types of triangles which implicitly 
follow from what it is for those triangles to be those types of triangles in the first place. 
Kenneth Manders, in his (1987), argues that the modern approach to the analysis of 
mathematical knowledge (via mathematical logic) has singularly addressed the epistemological 
issue of reliability, in terms of analysing the methods of inference employed in mathematical 
reasoning. Under this conception, the hallmark of mathematical knowledge is the iron-clad 
reliability of its inferences; and it is the critical analysis of these inferences which provides 
the research programme for mathematical logic. In terms of Descartes' distinction between 
clarity and distinctness, reliability is aligned with distinctness, as " ... the aspect of distinctness 
[makes] sure that the objects of study are precisely determined and reliably reasoned about." 9 
One issue Manders raises with this conception is that it lends itself to taking individual 
propositions10 as the units of investigation. There is little scope for addressing mathematical 
theories11 as wholes, and thus likewise for investigating the conceptual relationships between 
theories, especially in terms of why it is that some theories seem to be more accomodating 
to certain theorems than others. From the reliability-centred point of view, " ... mathematical 
progress is nothing but piling up one theorem on another." 12 
8It is true that this seems to not be that case when it comes to transfinite numbers: 7 ·No = No, as does 
n ·No for any n:::; N0 ; however this can be taken as a defining characteristic of what it means to be 'a number 
less than or equal to N0 
9Manders (1987), p.202 
10and inferences: an inference from A to B can be rendered as the proposition 'if A, then B', or 'from A, 
infer B'. 
11Throughout this discussion, I will be talking of mathematical of mathematical 'systems' and mathematical 
'settings'. While these terms are not intended to be synonymous, they overlap considerably; in terms of the 
discussion in §§3 and 4, a setting is 'rigourised' into a system, through the introduction of deductively closed 
codifications of the setting into a formal language. The term 'theory' is intended to cover both cases. 
12Manders (1987), p.195 
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In opposition t6 this kind of approach, Manders advocates a return to the Cartesian 
emphasis on the interdependance of clarity and distinctness in characterising mathematical 
knowledge. As the conceptual clarity of a theorem is a product of the relationship between the 
theorem and its background theory, it is a global feature of the background theory, rendering 
the distinctness/reliability approach inadequate due to its emphasis on individual propositions 
as autonomous objects of knowledge. 13 · This is doubly so when seeking to understand why 
some theories render some theorems more comprehensible (or 'natural'), as this involves a 
higher-level relationship between the theory where the theorem or conjecture was originally 
formulated, and the new theory which renders it further comprehensible. Hence, I will seek an 
explication of this notion of the clarity component of 'naturalness', by presenting it in contrast 
with distinctness/reliability. I will argue that seeing distinctness and clarity as working in 
tandem yields a way of viewing the conceptual relationships between mathematical theories 
which can account for the phenomenon of 'naturalness'. 
Let us begin with the distinctness/reliability condition. In modern mathematics, the 
ultimate standard of reliability is the (possibility, in principle of) embedding the system into 
set theory. Under this conception, all mathematical objects are sets, and all operations are 
operations on sets; the languages of indivj_dual theories are just convenient shorthands for the 
language of sets. However mathematical objects are entirely constituted by what is true of 
them. There is nothing more to any number than its logical interactions with other numbers -
and thus, nothing more to any set than its logical interactions with other sets. From a logical 
point of view, the result of this conception of mathematics there is no way to conceive of there 
being any conceptual continuity between two different mathematical theories. For instance, 
in the system of natural numbers, some differences cannot be calculated due to the absence 
of negative numbers. Thus 
\/x\/y?Jz(x- y = z) 
is false when x,y,z are arbitrarily taken from N, but true when taken from Z. Hence, by the 
converse of Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles14 these x,y,z denote different objects when those 
13ibid 
14If everything true of an object A is true of an object B, then A= B. The converse would be, if at least 
one thing true of A is not true of B, then A f' B. 
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objects are taken from Z as opposed toN and thus the above logical sentence means different 
things. Hence '5' and '+5' denote different objects. These considerations can be extrapolated 
to apply not just to numbers, but also to functions, sets, and all other mathematical objects. 
Thus, while objects internal to a mathematical theory are interdependant in terms of their 
properties and relations (if one property or relation is altered, the whole theory undergoes a 
systematic change), the total opposite is the case when it comes to an inter-theory perspective. 
The outcome of this, as mentioned above, is the CGrnplete loss of the ability to even conceive 
of any conceptual continuity between different settings. It may be countered that this is where 
set theory is able to do some explaining: if two theories are both able to be embedded in set 
theory, and thus all objects of both theories are treated as sets and all operations on those 
objects as sets, then we have a way to conceive of continuity between theories. '5' and '+5' 
both denote the same set. 15 However, while this does supply continuity, it completely does 
away with the other aspect of of our investigation - that the formulation of new settings which 
leads to increased comprehensibility of theorems and conjectures is a non-trivial intellectual 
accomplishment. In Manders' words, 
[S]et theoretic definability [does not] by itself set apart those relationships between 
(set theoretically definable) conceptual settings which constitute successful recon-
ceptualisations .. .from the infinitely many completely uninteresting ones. (1987, 
p.200; emphasis added) 
Thus, we have a dichotomy. On the one hand, one setting cannot be a more natural home 
for a theorem than another because the expression in the new setting expresses something 
different. Elliptic functions do not achieve additional clarity when defined over a complex 
doughnut rather than the complex plane, because these are definitionally different functions. 
On the other hand, one setting cannot be more natural than another because all settings are 
interpretations of set theory, and thus enjoy the same epistemic status. 
Over-emphasis on the reliability-theoretic approach also results in the loss of our other 
15up to isomorphism: e.g. Zermelo vs. von Neumann ordinals. 
9 
major concern, clarity. Manders notes that " ... .fully formalised proofs are often unintelligi-
ble .. .increased precision is often achieved at the expense of clarity." 16 Likewise, Saunders Mac 
Lane observes that 
All mathematics can indeed be built up within set theory, but the description 
of many mathematical objects as structures [i.e., as sensitive to setting] is much 
more illuminating then some explicit set-theoretic description. (1996, p.182) 
To state the obvious, most mathematicians do not 'think' in set theory. They think in what 
may be termed an informal metalangauge, where intuitive notions are used and explored in 
finding inspiration for taking research in certain directions, or using a certain proof strategy in 
some particular instance. If the only fundamental task in the philosophy of mathematics were 
to formulate a logical system which can display the reliability of mathematical knowledge, 
then statements such as those above would not be finding their way into published papers. 
I will now show that it can be seen that the rEiliability approach, and its attendant loss of 
conceptual continuity and/ or respect for innovation, are the result of an implicit assumption 
that mathematics is purely what is termed an extensional matter. To clarify this claim, i will 
give a brief outline of the extension/intension distinction. 
In natural language, most terms have both an extension and an intension. The extension 
is the collection of objects to which the term applies; the intension is what it is that makes 
those objects part of that collection. For (a well-worn) example, the terms 'creature with 
a heart' and 'creature with a kidney' have the same extension (on planet Earth, at least). 
However, this is the result of contingent facts about the way organic life has evolved on our 
planet; there is no necessity in the answer as to why the extensions are the same. In the 
formal study of the semantics of natural language, the distinction is made using hypothetical 
possible worlds; the extension of 'creature with a heart' is the set of all creatures with a heart 
in the actual world, whilst the intension is the set of creatures with a heart in all possible 
worlds. 17 Equivalently, it would be erroneous to infer from the identity of extensions that 
16Manders (1987), p.202 [order reversed] 
17Kearns (2000), pp. 17-18 
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any creature with a heart will also have a kidney (or two). Thus, the terms have different 
intensions - i.e., different meanings. The hallmark of two terms having different intensions, 
even when they share a common extension, is the a priori conceivability of one of the terms 
being true of an object while the other is not - i.e. the hypothetical possibility of such an 
occurrence. 
'D.'aditionally, intension has been seen to have a larger share in philosophically problematic 
notions, such as reference. It is usually a lot easier to resolve disagreements about extensions 
than about intensions (through the citing of similar cases, etc). Modern logic, with its concen-
tration on argument form, rather than conceptual content, is an attempt to render reasoning 
more perspicuous by eliminating intensions altogether - art argument is valid if and only if it 
displays one or another (i.e., is in the extension) of the various argument forms, which are 
selected on the basis of truth-functional connectives. These connectives, by virtue of taking 
truth-values to truth-values, are likewise extensional objects, as will be explained below. A 
possible slogan for the extensional approach is 'objects are prior to properties', as properties 
are defined by the collection of objects of which they hold. An instance if this approach is 
the standard set-theoretic definition of an n-ary function as a set of ordered n-tuples. 
To illustrate how an more intension-sensitive view would look like, consider the model-
theoretic definition of what it is for an n-place predicate to apply to n terms: 
For instance, where the domain IAI = N, P is the ':::;' relation, f is the successor function, 
and c is the constant zero, the open formula 
VxPyx 
is not satisfiable (i.e. is not included in the extension of the satisfaction function s) .19 In the 
language of model theory, this is because 
18Hereon abbreviated as 'iff' 
19Because the formula is open, the free occurrence of y can be regarded as universally quantified, (albeit 
implicitly). 
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~A Pyx[s(xjc)] 
i.e. there is an x, namely c, and a y, f(c), such that 
(f(c), c) rj pA 
The ordered pair (!(c), c), which denotes (1, 0), is not an element of the set pA, the set which 
defines what the predicate 'P' means in this particular model of the natural numbers. If 
we were to alter the composition of the set pA to include (!(c), c), then the set would no 
longer denote the usual '~' relation. Hence, one alteration to any element of pA will result 
in that predicate having a different extension, and thus be a different predicate. The obvious 
rejoinder is that we choose the extension of the set pA precisely because it will mirror the 
(intuitive) meaning of '~', which brings us to our next point. 
Regarded from the set- or model-theoretic perspective, functions and predicates are sets or 
ordered n-tuples of sets, respectively.20 These sets are given the extensions they have in order 
to mirror the 'intuitive' meanings of whatever we are setting out to formally describe. Where 
do these 'intuitive' concepts come from? From an intensional point of view, a function can 
be a method, rule, or operation for turning some things into other things. It is an action that 
can be performed, not a static set of n-tuples. Hence, speaking intensionally, we can regard 
subtraction inN and Z as being the same operation (without resort to set theory), as the 
method for obtaining the output is the same: the only difference is that in Z some outputs can 
be obtained which are absent from N. An analogous example makes the connection clearer: 
consider the 'function' of painting objects green. If one is in a rocky locale, then green 
rocks result from application of the 'function' to the available 'inputs'. However, if one is 
in a woodland, then green sticks are also, att,ain.able. The method, that of painting objects 
green, is constant. Thus, a recognition of the role of an intensional, informal metalanguage 
20 An interesting possible exception to this is the notion of a 'function-class', a function that is defined by a 
formula rather than a set of n-tuples. It is called a 'function-class' because it can be defined on all sets, and 
the universe of all sets is a class (and not a set). If the range of a function includes classes, then it will not be 
a set. One result of this is that the axiom of replacement in ZF is in fact not an axiom but an axiom schema, 
that is, an infinite set of axioms (see Gowers (ed) 2008, pp.621-2). This may have interesting implications for 
the relationship between extensions and formulae; unfortunately, such speculations are beyond the scope of 
this discussion. 
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can supply us with both the grounds for seeing conceptual continuity between settings while 
preserving a role for non-trivial accomplishment, as well as the source of the intuitive grounds 
we appeal to when determining the extensions of the sets which formally define functions and 
predicates for the purpose of model-theoretic analysis. 
Considering the idea that preserving a role for an intensional view of mathematics is 
fruitful for explaining the existence of both inter-theory continuity of concepts and innovation, 
it would seem gainful to investigate whether such a stance can shed further light on our more 
specific task at hand - seeking a source of the 'naturalness' that some settings display with 
regard to certain theorems over others. In particular, I shall focus on the notion of logical 
consequence, for it seems that if conceptual continuity of the content of theorems exists 
between theories, then so must an associated notion of what it is for a theorem or definition 
to (deductively) imply another. 
4 Logical Consequence 
For all the philosophical issues attendant to a purely extensional approach to mathematical 
reasoning, such a stance does afford a very useful mathematical technique: a purely formal 
notion of logical consequence (model theory). The mathematical usefulness of model theory 
lies in the fact that a mathematical proof can be rendered down into a formal language 
(usually, but by no means always, first-order logic). This proceeds via the selection of an 
appropriate formal language and a selection of objects which are to be candidates for the 
denotations of the variables and constants of the language (this set is the domain; the function 
which assigns objects to constants and/or variables is the satisfaction function; the domain 
and the satisfaction function taken together form the model). Once this 'rigourisation' has 
been carried out, any (legitimate) proof in the original theory can be 'reduced' to a finite 
number of gap-free steps, all of which are sanctioned by the rules of the appropriate logic. 
Thus, anyone who wishes to disagree with the result of a given proof will either have to reject 
one of its premises, or one of its inferences - the latter option intended to be unavailable on 
13 
pain of irrationality.21 
Nevertheless, for all this mathematical footwork, it remains that model theory is a math-
ematical stand-in for our 'pre-theoretic' notion of what it is for one thing to follow another. 
Analogous examples abound; for instance, the continuum is a mathematical model of our pre-
theoretic notion of what it is for a straight line to be able to intersect another at any point 
on the line (the notions of 'point' and 'line' are further such instances). Stewart Shapiro 
notes that in firmly established areas of modern mathematics, model theory comes so close 
to our pre-theoretic conception of mathematical reasoning that it now serves as the standard 
for logical consequence, rather than a technical stand-in.22 Shapiro gives the analogy of a 
dictionary; it serves as the standard of correct spelling and usage, though this is not taken to 
mean that the dictionary constitutes the origin of those standards. The case is the same with 
mathematical reasoning, though this is by no means widely acknowledged - the reason for 
this may be seen as a consequence of the over-emphasis on the formal nature of mathematics 
which has been present in the philosophy of mathematics over the last hundred years or so. 23 
There are many ways to explicate the pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence, and they 
may not all be equivalent; such is the lot of pre-theoretic notions. Nevertheless, it does not 
seem unjustified to take as a working definition the familiar idea of material consequence -
that is, that 
(i) B is a logical consequence of A iff it is impossible for A to be true and B to be false 
Hopefully, its inadequacies will be just as illuminating as its successes. Notice that in using 
the term 'impossible', this is a metaphysical definition (it is to do with the way the world is). 
However, the activity of logic can be seen to have an epistemological, as well as metaphysical 
dimension; thus (i) can be augmented with the following epistemically flavoured variant 
21 Provided that the method of reduction is also accepted 
22Shapiro (1998), p.155 
23cf. Manders (1987), p.196: "The dominant theme in philosophical justification of work and programs 
in mathematical logic throughout the past century has been that "logical foundations of mathematics" is a 
reliability-theoretic enterprise and reliability is the unique necessary and sufficient condition of mathematical 
knowledge." [emphasis original] 
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(ii) B is a logical consequence of A iff it is irrational to hold that A is true and B is false 
So much for the metaphysics/epistemology demarcation, However, before we move on, there 
is one more consideration that should be noted: the idea of relevance. There is a long 
tradition, stretching back to antiquity, of the idea that one thing can be a logical consequence 
of another only if the two are somehow related.24 The concern with relevance arises from the 
nature of material implication, in that definitions (i) and (ii) do not require any relation of 
relevance between the premise(s) A and the conclusion B; such inferences, where there is no 
such connection, are known as 'paradoxes of material implication'. Consider the following 
(classically) valid inference: 
p---+ (QV•Q) 
This inference form sanctions the following argument as va:lid: · 'the tree outside my window is 
green, therefore either the local shop is open or it is not open'. Such inferences can be taken 
as counterintuitive, for obvious reasons. 'Relevance logics' attempt to avoid such results by 
(in one instance) restricting implications to holding only between propositions which have 
one or more variables in common (depending on the logic). While I will not address relevance 
logics any further, the idea that relevance is implicit in our pre-theoretic notion of logical 
consequence will return to the forefront of this discussion in the next section. 
We have come to see that the formal object-language/informal metalanguage division 
which is present in the methodology of working mathematicians can be characterised by 
the extension/intension distinction borrowed from natural language. The formal language of 
mathematics, whether considered to be first- or higher-order logic, applied via model theory 
to set theory, is a purely extensional language; all objects and operations are entirely char-
acterised by their relations to other objects and operations. However, holding that in this 
consists the entirety of the mathematical endeavour presents a dichotomy; either there is no 
continuity at all between different mathematical theories, or there is 'maximal' continuity, 
in that all mathematical objects from all theories &resets. Both positions do away with the 
idea that the formulation of a new setting which renders certain theorems more comprehen-
24see Shapiro (1998), p.133 
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sible and/or tractable is a genuine intellectual achievement. But, taking note of the fact that 
working mathematicians often work within a more informal framework, one which involves 
conceptual notions construed as intensional, we can avoid the above dichotomous conclusion. 
This leads us to consider the informal, intensional notion of logical consequence, in particular 
how it is to be characterised as holding between an old system and a new setting which results 
in the phenomenon of some theorems seeming more 'natural'. The next section will outline a 
philosophical position which will accomodate and explain these considerations. 
5 Natural Language and the Foundations ofMathemat-
. 
lCS 
From the above considerations, it does not seem unwarranted to assert that when formulating 
a new setting for the purposes of exploring how new theorems will behave in an altered 
setting, the mathematical reasoning which occurs takes place primarily in the intensional 
metalanguage. This conception works for two reasons: one, we look upon the operations 
which can be performed in the new settings as 'extended' versions of those present in the old 
system; and two, it preserves the idea that such formulations, when successful, are non-trivial 
accomplishments. 
We would do well to take note of thE) fact that when a new theory is being formulated 
and investigated, it is yet to be possessed of the rigorous formalisation into a (usually) first-
order language. Thus, the extensional is yet to be available as a view of the new theory. 
It is only once the theory has reached a certain point of maturation that it can be thus 
codified. However, there are historical cases where one or more of the developments which 
constitute formalisation have preceded the rest, and thus themselves served as the stimulus 
for research into a new area.25 In the words of Kenneth Manders, " ... genuine mathematical 
accomplishment consists primarily in making clear by using new concepts." 26 
25However, there may be historical cases where one or more of the developments which constitute formali-
sation have preceded the rest, and thus themselves served as the stimulus for research into a new area, which 
I will not go into here. Nevertheless, it seems that the majority of cases are those which arise from the search 
for conceptual clarity 
26Manders (1987), p.193 (emphasis original) 
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Be that as it may, Manders goes on to observe that " ... results also have to be correct to 
count as making something clear ... " 27 But, if the new setting is yet to be mathematically 
rigourised to the point of constituting a new calculating system, how can these results be 
known to be correct? Hence we observe the return of the reliability condition. It is this 
question which I will seek to address in this section, To get clear about the kind of conception 
we need, I will first outline the philosophical position known as 'nai:ve realism' regarding 
mathematical objects - also known as 'Platonism'. I will then mention some faults inherent 
in this position, and go on to formulate an alternative. 
The standard contemporary formulation of this position is the conjunction of two claims: 
(1) that all mathematical theories can be reduced to set theory, and (2) sets exist in a timeless 
manner which is ontologically independant of the material world (in particular, the beings and 
doings of mathematicians). For classical mathematics, this includes the claim of the existence 
of the infinite set. Nai:ve realism about mathematical objects has many problems. Among 
these is the well-known issue of epistemic access: if mathematical objects are timeless and do 
not occupy any spacial location, then it seems that we are incapable of the kind of interaction 
with them that is required for our gaining knowledge of, theirproperties.28 Also problematic 
is the (sometimes unexpected) applicability of mathematics to many real-world phenomena 
(again, a consequence of mathematical objects' non-physical. existence). Due to the already 
vast existent literature on the subject, I will go no further than to state an alternative to 
nai:ve realism which can be described as the 'semantic conception' .29 
Under the semantic conception, we know mathematical truths because they are truths of 
meaning; often described as 'true by definition,'30 we are able to apply them to our physical 
surroundings because they are constituted by the same phenomena as ordinary language us-
age. Thus, taking mathematical truth to be a variety of linguistic truth, and mathematical 
'objects' as on par with linguistic terms, our epistemic access to, and the empirical applica-
27ibid 
28See Benacerraf (1973) 'Mathematical Truth', The Journal of Philosophy, 70:661-669 
29This view, or a similar one, often goes by the moniker 'conventionalism'; however, this term has consid-
erable historical baggage, which I wish to avoid 
30 And thus analytic. However, as it is not especially per~inent t9 my c313e, I will not address the question 
as to whether mathematical truths are analytic or synthetic (requiring more than knowledge of the meaning 
of the sub-sentential terms in order for their truth to be determined) or the other philosophical bugbear of 
whether the analytic/synthetic distinction is ultimately viable. 
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bility of, mathematics becomes just as problematic as the existence and applicability of the 
term 'dog'. And while it is undoubtably the case that ordinary natural language has its own 
philosophical worries, it should soon become clear that not only does the semantic conception 
of mathematics avoid the pitfalls of na'ive realism, it also supplies us with an interesting and 
novel way of conceiving of the relationship between inter-theory conceptual continuity and its 
non-trivial attainability, model theory, and O]lr pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence. 
Now, the charge most often brought against semantic conceptions of mathematical truth 
is that they make the disci very /invention of new mathematical ideas 'arbitrary'. By this it is 
meant that if mathematical truth is in the same conceptual category as linguistic truth, then 
that truth depends on us; specifically, on what we accept as the correct meaning/usage for 
any given mathematical term. As stated by Shanker: 
The most common criticism levelled against [the semantic conception] is that 
mathematical truth must be sempiternal and universal: properties that outstrip 
the reach of conventions, which are rooted to the decisions of a speaker or com-
munity. (1987, p.303) 
Furthermore: 
The feeling behind [this] criticism is that the [semanticist] contends that a math-
ematical proposition only expresses either a speaker's or a community's decision 
to use symbols in a certain way. (ibid, p.304) 
Hence, if this truth is dependant on us, then it is inferred that we are 'free' to use the symbols 
in any way we want; we can make any mathematical statement true or false, almost on a whim. 
In terms of the example given in §1, the introduction of ideal points is an arbitrary decision 
designed to simply rule out problematic cases, such as when the line projected through a 
point is parallel to the new plane, resulting projection not being a one-to-one correspondence. 
Ideal elements allow us to simply 'disregard' such cases. Because this is a decision, and not 
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a discovery, it cannot tell us anything. For another example, all that is required for the 
Goldbach conjecture to be considered true (and thus, actually be true) is that all or most 
mathematicians in the world start considering it to be true. That is, that it becomes a 
property of all the symbols which denote the natural numbers greater than two and divisible 
by two that they cannot appear in the formula 
where P is the set of primes. Because, under the semantic conception of mathematical truth, 
there is no gap between accepted truth and actual truth, opponents of this consideration 
take it to be a position which trivialises or disregards the accomplishment inherent in a 
mathematician's solving a difficult problem. Concurrent is the notion that when formulating 
a new mathematical system, we are free to make any axiom, rule or object behave in any 
way we want to, without the constraints normally seen as necessary to have mathematics 
'make sense'. I will argue that this is not the case, and in doing so explain why a semantic 
conception of mathematical truth is able to account for the phenomenon of naturalness. 
My argument rests on the following idea: that while it is indeed the case that we are 'free' 
when constructing new mathematical theories, this does not mean that any old way of doing 
things will suffice. However, I cleave to the semantic conception's notion that mathematical 
truth does not exist prior to ratification; the truths of (pure) mathematics are not 'out there' 
to be discovered. We 'make' some mathematical statements true, others false, by regarding 
them as such. Nevertheless, this 'making' is not done by any force of will or raw desire, but 
by a process more analogous to being 'convinced'. 
Now, it seems plausible to regard most mathematicians as believing that it is possible or 
desirable for mathematics to one day be organised into a vast interlinking network, where every 
mathematical truth is a (somewhat) logical outcome of the sum total of all other mathematical 
truths. Thus it seems we have at least one constraint on the choices to be made when a 
new system is being constructed: the new system cannot be so strange and bizarre as to 
be unrecognisable as mathematics to the average mathematician. 31 This, in turn, leads to 
31 It may be argued that there are historical exceptions to thi.s rule; thE) introduction of 'imaginary' numbers, 
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further constraints. For one, the rules of derivation (be they explicitly stated, or only used 
implicitly) must be possessed of some kind of constancy. For instance, 'take propositions A 
and B; flip a coin; if the result is heads, then B is a logical consequence of A' does not seem 
acceptable. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more i~po~~tantly, the new theory must be able to 'explain' its 
presence, usually in terms of theories already existent (which may or may not have served as 
the initial motivation for the formulation of the new theory in the first place). Thus, analytic 
geometry 'explains its presence' by being able to offer one singular proof of a situation which 
may require several synthetic proofs; projective geometry explains itself by its ability to 
simplify many of the theorems of prior geometries, and so forth. Perhaps one of the most 
eloquent statements, by way of analogy with musical composition, of this situation is the 
following: 
A succession of two musical notes is an act of choice; the first causes the second, 
not in the scientific sense of making it occur necessarily, but in the historical sense 
of provoking it, of providing it with a motive for occuring. A successful melody 
is a self-determining history; it is freely what it intends to be, yet is a meaningful 
whole, not an arbitrary succession of notes. (Auden, 1975, p.465-632 ) 
It is in this 'historical sense' that we should regard one mathematical theory as being 'caused' 
by another. Note that this implies two things - one, mathematical 'objects' are not required 
beyond being linguistic entities, and thus the nai:ve realist's epistemic access and applicability 
worries vanish- and two, the 'explaining itself' that a mathematical theory needs to be seen to 
do is an ongoing process, one which accompanies the progression toward rigourisation hinted 
at above. To illustrate my point, I shall give a historical example. 
Up until modern times, the axioms of Euclidean geometry were held to be self-evident; this 
or maybe Kronecker's opposition to Cantor's explorations· of completed infinities. My belief is that it can be 
counter-argued that (1) these cases will always be in the minority, and (2) the subsequent acceptance of these 
techniques bears them out. What is important is the attitude of the entire mathematical community, not the 
attitudes of one or two exceptionally vocal an.d well-placed critics. 
32Cited in Shanker, 1987, p.338 
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self-evidence was taken to be known through some kind of 'intuition'. The idea of intuition 
underpinning the (base) truths of mathematics found its culmination in the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant, in his holding that mathematical truths are synthetic a priori (for Kant, all 
synthetic knowledge is reached via intuition). As is well known, the advent of non-Euclidean 
geometry had most philosophers of mathematics (and most mathematicians) concluding that 
it is in fact self-consistency which is the driving force of mathematical truth, and not some kind 
of psychological faculty or occurrence. 33 These events occurred mostly in the 19th century; 
the early 20th century saw the rise of model theoty, the mathematically rigourised counterpart 
to our pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence. 
One pioneering use of model theory was Hilbert's proofs of the independance of the Eu-
clidean axioms from one another in his Grundlagen der Geometrie, where his methodology 
was to give a model for each axiom in which that axiom is true but the others are false. 
Notice how this squares with the definitions (i) and (ii) of material consequence - Hilbert 
had given mathematical reasons for why certain mathematical statements are not even pre-
theoretic logical consequences of one another; the existence of these models proved that it was 
metaphysically possible for one axiom to be true while the others are all false, and the mathe-
matical rigour of his method gave compelling reasons to regard it rational to believe that this 
is the case. Hilbert quotes Kant in that work: "All human knowledge begins with intuitions, 
thence passes to concepts and ends with ideas". 34 However, Shapiro notes in his analysis 
of the origins of model theory that " ... the plan executed in that work is far from Kantian. 
In Hilbert's hands, the slogan "passes to concepts and ends with ideas" comes to something 
like "is replaced by logical relations between ideas."" Furthermore, "In Hilbert's writing ... the 
role of intuition is carefully and rigourously limited to motivation and heuristic." 35 Thus, we 
can see that the notion of 'intuitive' consequence operant in Kant's conception of the foun-
dations of geometry gets replaced by 'logical consequence' in Hilbert's axiomatisation, where 
the 'logical' is understood as 'model-theoretic'. 
My contention is that it is possible to see Hilbert's Grundlagen as a historical, explicit 
instantiation of what occurs implicitly in most extensions and subsequent rigourisations of 
33Brouwer and his followers can be regarded as possible exceptions. 
34 Critique of Pure Reason, A702/B730. Quoted in Shapiro (1998), p.157 
35Both ibid; emphasis in the second quotation is mine. 
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mathematical fields of inquiry. At the outset, intuitive notions of logical consequence and 
what objects/operations are present in the setting are primarily operant - witness how the 
propositions of Euclid's Elements are things that one is proposed to do. Thus, that a theorem 
follows from the axioms and definitions is ensured by the (possible) construction of a figure, not 
'facts of the matter' as to what logically implies what. However, as rigourisation progresses, 
as it inevitably does in mathematics, the intuitive, intensional notions are supplanted by their 
extensional counterparts - with (in the present day) the limit case being the embedding of 
the new system into a set-theoretic metatheory. Such embedding can be seen as the ultimate 
way for a mathematical theory to 'explain itself' in terms of its antecedants. Nevertheless, 
the intensional remains, to serve as a 'motivating' and 'heuristic' dimension of the theory -
primarily useful teaching and in finding new directions for research. As emphasised above, 
intuition was not totally absent from Hilbert's Grundlagen. 
As an interesting corollary of these considerations, we can view the gradual transition from 
the intensional to the extensional as being the.source of the feeling of mathematical 'discovery' 
which makes na!ve realism about mathematical objects such an intuitively attractive concep-
tion. Under my alternative, it is not the properties of timeless non-physical mathematical 
objects that are 'discovered', but rather the facts of the matter as to what formal notions best 
supplant the prior, intuitive ones. Such investigation will be subject to pragmatic concerns; 
for instance there is usually an implicit 'principle of minimal disturbance' dictating that the 
structural integrity of the theory is paramount. It was long held that in the postulation of new 
number systems, the arithmetical properties (uniqueness of sums, distributivity of multipli-
cation over addition, etc) must always remain constant. However, the inclusion in projective 
geometry of co-ordinate numbers which square to -1 (which results in the inability to form 
the resulting complex number system into an ordered field) the dictum that all properties of 
numbers be held invariant in all number systems is disregarded because of the demonstrate 
possibility of elegant new theor(:)ms. Instances of the fact that such theorems can result from 
the inclusion of such 'problematic' concepts is what can be rightly said to be 'discovered' in 
mathematical investigation. 
At this juncture, all that remains is to give an analysis of the pre-theoretic notion of logical 
consequence which is operating in the early, pre-rigourisation phase of the development of a 
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new mathematical theory. As stated above, we should take it to be an intensional conception, 
that is, more closely aligned with taking the meaning of 'creature with a heart' to be what it is 
for a creature to have a heart, rather than the collection of creatures with hearts. Remember, 
to intensionally regard a function is to see it as a method or process for turning one object (the 
input) into another (the output). This is where the notion of relevance enters the picture. In 
ordinary language, the intuitive idea of what follows from another is (often) intensional, based 
on content and meaning, and hence concerned with relevance. For instance, a courtroom jury 
would probably not convict someone of a crime based on an argument from the evidence 
which included a paradox of material implication- or at least, it seems undesirable that they 
do so. Thus the existence of a research programme for relevance logics; such research would 
not be carried out if the paradoxes of material implication were not regarded (by some) as 
counterintuitive. 36 
This gives us another reason for rejecting the idea that a semantic conception of math-
ematical truth renders new proofs and theorems arbitrary. If we see the intensional idea of 
logical consequence as the one at work when new settings are formulated, then the regarding 
of a new theory as a 'consequence' of the old (perhaps in terms of problems which could not 
be solved in the old theory, thus motivating the formulation of the new) will mean that the 
relevance of the new to the old is taken into account, because one is an intensional conse-
quence of the other only if they are somehow related. It should not be possible to point to an 
instance of a paradox of material implication when it comes to the intensional metatheoretic 
links between mathematical systems. 
6 Conclusion 
In §1 I gave an example of the movement to a new setting resulting in conceptual sim-
plification of a mathematical theory. Recopnceptualisation can result in certain theorems 
appearing more 'natural' when done successfully. §2 began the philosophical analysis of this 
36It may be asked, if paradoxes of material implication are counterintuitive, why do we codify their possibility 
into mathematical logic? The answer would seem to be because of the extreme interrelatedness internally 
displayed by mathematical systems. In such systems, everything is relevant. 
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phenomenon, and brought us to consider the nature of the relationship between theories and 
their new settings. In an effort to accommodate both conceptual continuity of objects and 
operations between theories and a regard for mathematical advances as genuine intellectual 
achievements, we recognised a role for an informal, intensional metalanguage of mathematics 
in addition to the formal, extensional language used to rigourously express mathematical the-
orems. This in turn led us to the concept of logical consequence in §3; here also we recognise 
a role for both the informal (intuitive) and formal (model-theoretic) notions. Having reached 
these conclusions, we found that a semantic conception of mathematics, where both the in-
tensional and extensional forms of mathematical expression are (metaphysically) fragments of 
natural language enabled us to both skirt the traditional problems attendant to nai:ve realism 
and account for our conclusions regarding the naturalness that certain settings display over 
others. Before I conclude, I will offer an intuitive picture of the conception of mathematical 
advancement which our conclusions have led us to. 
We begin with a fairly mature mathematical theory, either fully formalised or well on 
its way. Nevertheless, certain conjectures are proving resistant to proof, and/or there are 
theorems which can be proved but are tediously difficult. A new setting is proposed, for 
instance one which contains new objects. At this early stage, research is mainly conducted 
along the lines provided by the conceptual content of the intensional view of the theorems and 
operations of the old system. However, as this research progresses, the proofs become more and 
more formal, as the logical investigation of the new setting progresses. When alternative, non-
equivalent formal definitions are proposed, their implications are explored and debate ensues 
over which best fits the intuiive concept being investigated. Eventually, purely formal rules 
dictating the relationships between the theorems of the new setting are proposed, codifying 
the results of the more informal proofs. As this progresses, the intuitive aspect plays less and 
less of a role: the limit case is that of Hilbert's Grundlagen, where intuition is relegated to 
heuristic and motivational purposes only. However, as still being motivational, the intuitive 
is still present to provide inspiration arid hints at possible directions for new research in the 
future. 
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